University of the Pacific

Scholarly Commons
McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles

McGeorge School of Law Faculty Scholarship

2015

Trademark Enforcement Issues in the United States: Bullies and
Trolls
Michael S. Mireles Jr.
University of the Pacific, mmireles@pacific.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/facultyarticles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael S. Mireles Jr., Trademark Enforcement Issues in the United States: Bullies and Trolls, 19 JOURNAL
OF INTERNET LAW 26 (2015).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/facultyarticles/530

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the McGeorge School of Law Faculty Scholarship at
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles by an
authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.

J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N E T L AW

Trademark
Enforcement
Issues in the
United States:
Bullies and Trolls
By Mike Mireles
his article examines the supposed trademark bullies and trademark trolls problem in the United
States. There are numerous reports and complaints
of trademark bullies and to a lesser extent trademark trolls. First, this article reviews the evidence
concerning trademark bullies, provides an explanation for the problem with trademark bullies and discusses attempts to deal with the problem. Second, it
explains why a trademark troll problem is unlikely to
develop in the United States.
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TERMS DEFINED
A trademark bully generally is defined as a large
and relatively wealthy entity that enforces its trademark with an overreaching claim against smaller,
less wealthy entities. The overreaching claim can
sometimes chill First Amendment protected speech,
such as criticism, or impinge on fair competition.
The trademark bully may force a financially “weaker”
entity to stop using a mark based on a threat—
usually with a cease and desist letter—of expensive
litigation. Instead of fighting and testing the claim,
the “victim” of the “bully” capitulates. You could
imagine a trademark owner gradually strengthening
the scope of its mark by influencing others to stop
using any similar mark or making any criticism of
their mark.
A trademark troll generally is defined as an entity
that uses trademark law, without actually using a mark
in commerce, to extract licensing fees from others
who are using the trademark. The trademark troll
essentially attempts to “hold up” those who are using
the trademark.

TRADEMARK BULLIES:
DO THEY EXIST?
There is a significant amount of anecdotal evidence of trademark bullying and a few studies that
may support its existence. For example, a recent Wall
Street Journal article discussed the trademark enforcement practices of Travelers. Travelers is an insurance
company that uses an umbrella symbol as a trademark. The article notes that Travelers has enforced its
trademark against companies attempting to use a logo
in numerous industries such as, “a California program
to improve children’s health, an antivirus software
firm, a Polish nutritional-supplement producer, and
even the umbrella-making Totes Isotoner Corp.”1
There are numerous other examples of trademark
owners enforcing their trademarks against third parties, including the notorious Vermonster case and the
entertaining Louis Vuitton cease and desist letter to a
University of Pennsylvania intellectual property law
student group. In an example of extensive enforcement efforts, in Salu, Inc. v. Original Skin Store, the
court stated that, “[Plaintiff] has sent out over 300
cease and desist letters to alleged infringers in the last
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couple of years alone.”2 However, it is unclear whether
the letters were based on overreaching claims.
There also are several studies that appear to
support the idea that there is a trademark bullying
problem. Professor Kenneth Port’s study notes that
there is a rise in the number of trademark case filings, but fewer reported decisions.3 He posits that
trademark extortion (bullying) is the reason for the
difference.4 He also makes the claim that weak cases
are increasing over time based on the number of
summary judgment awards to defendants.5 Professor
William Gallagher’s study “supports the thesis that
trademarks … can be and often are over-enforced in
everyday legal practice.”6 Professor Gallagher interviewed numerous trademark practitioners who stated
that they “sometimes enforce admittedly weak IP
claims precisely because it can be an effective strategy
with few downsides.”7
The well-known US Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) Trademark Litigation Study attempted to
quantify and explain the problem with “trademark
bullying.”8 Unfortunately, it failed to live up to its
promise and has been subject to substantial criticism.
The Trademark Litigation Study noted that, “Most of
the direct respondents claimed at least some degree
of first-hand knowledge of instances where unduly
aggressive trademark litigation or pre-litigation tactics (e.g., cease-and-desist letters) were targeted at
small businesses.”9 However, the Trademark Litigation
Study also noted that:
When asked if they currently encounter the
problem of other trademark owners using their
trademark rights to harass and intimidate
another business beyond what the law might
be reasonably interpreted to allow (e.g., is
“trademark bullying a problem”), few commenters explicitly addressed whether and to
what extent this issue is a significant problem.
Given the limited number of comments and
the varied nature of the commenters own
experiences, the comments may be better
viewed as anecdotal.10
The Trademark Litigation Study further discussed
how commenters noted that there is an “obligation to
police their marks, and the cease-and-desist letter
is a necessary, cost-effective part of the process.”11
The overarching impression from the Trademark
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Litigation Study is that it is very hard to define how
big of a problem exists. Commentators were likely
disappointed because they may have expected to
discover stronger evidence of trademark bullying and
a strong condemnation of that practice that would
support substantial change to existing trademark law.

TRADEMARK BULLIES:
WHY DO THEY EXIST?
The clue to understanding the results of the
USPTO Trademark Litigation Study is relatively
simple: Most “bully-like” behavior exists because
trademark law and theory encourage it. As several
scholars have explained, trademark law essentially is
reactive and the consumer search costs theory that
explains much of trademark law facilitates the laws
reactive nature.12
The consumer search costs theory mostly revolves
around the focus on the reduction of consumer confusion to lessen the costs associated with the repeat
purchase of goods and services. The law and the protection the law provides is driven by that theory. That
theory is generally moored to consumer perception
and understanding, which is constantly evolving and
reacting to various influences. Indeed, the strength
and arguably the corresponding value of a trademark
are linked to what consumers think and a valuable
mark may completely lose protection because of a
change in consumer understanding. In some ways,
the existence and scope of trademark protection (and
corresponding value) lies in the hands of the trademark owner. Any rational owner of a valuable asset
will do whatever it legally can to protect that asset.
This includes vigorous enforcement of a trademark
to ensure that not only is the mark not weakened
and lost, but also that it increases in strength, and
preserves the ability to move into related geographic
and product markets. Courts examine the usage of a
mark or a similar mark by third parties to determine
the strength and validity of a mark in numerous cases.
The need to enforce a trademark is truly not a bug,
but a major feature of our trademark system.
Thus, there should be no surprise that vigorous
enforcement is the rule and not the exception. If
trademark attorneys are asked if they enforce their
clients’ marks, the answer is, of course, yes. All
attorneys must counsel their clients to enforce their
27
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marks. A more difficult question concerns whether
there is overreaching enforcement. This question is
hard because the scope of trademark protection is
anything but clear. Indeed, there is now sponsorship,
affiliation, association, and connection confusion.
There is initial interest confusion and post-sale confusion. Dilution law provides broad rights. Trademark
defenses may vary across jurisdiction. The new theories of trademark harm develop and expand because
consumer understanding changes and reacts to the
practices of brand owners. Moreover, the facts of
each case and the expansion plans of each trademark
owner are different. Each trademark owner also has
a specific image associated with the brand that a
trademark owner may believe is worth protecting. For
example, the “Honest” brand is one which relies on a
promise that the product may be “natural,” “healthy,”
and environmentally safe.13 One person’s perception
of an overreaching claim may differ from another’s
based on the values, perspective and goals concerning the brand. This explains, perhaps, the “lukewarm”
results of the USPTO’s Trademark Litigation Study.
Likely, most trademark attorneys sincerely believe
their own enforcement practices are just and not
overreaching even if not particularly strong.
Another critical point to remember about trademark owners is that they serve the important function
of lessening public deception in the marketplace in a
generally cost-effective way for society. Instead of a
system that primarily relies on the government to
address public deception concerning marks, private
actors mostly bear the costs (besides the costs of
the court system) of finding and stopping confusingly similar uses of marks. The interests of society
and the trademark owner are aligned in halting
confusingly similar uses of marks. This alignment
of interests is altered by dilution law, and arguably
by some broad constructions of types of confusion
besides source confusion. This is troubling particularly when First Amendment protected speech may
be involved and third parties may be using expressive
works.14 The Trademark Dilution Revision Act does
include numerous exclusions that may protect First
Amendment protected speech.
The Rogers v. Grimaldi15 test has become the
leading test concerning First Amendment speech
and the use of trademarks. Notably, the Rogers test
has been applied at the motion to dismiss stage. For
example, in Rebellion Development Limited v. Stardock
28
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Entertainment, the district court determined that
application of the Rogers test was appropriate at the
motion to dismiss stage.16 The district court noted:
Courts are cognizant of vindicating First
Amendment protections through early dispositive motions to avoid chilling speech.
However, Plaintiffs argue that the Rogers
test is not well-suited to an early dispositive
motion. They claim that this is because courts
do not regularly decide the applicability of
the First Amendment defense by making their
own conclusions about the underlying work at
the pleading stage, particularly when a court
has not even had the opportunity to examine
the underlying work.
The Rogers test is an appropriate one to apply
in the early stages of litigation. Although
the Court has not found a case directly on
point, it concludes that the First Amendment
should be considered an appropriate affirmative defense based on similar cases in the
Sixth Circuit … .17
The district court went on to dismiss the plaintiff’s infringement claim that defendant’s use of
plaintiff’s mark in a title to a videogame based on
Rogers v. Grimaldi.18 Hopefully, other courts will
continue to adopt and use Rogers v. Grimaldi early in
litigation to dispose of suits that may impinge on First
Amendment protected speech. This provides some
protection against overreaching claims which that
improperly impinge on protected First Amendment
speech.19

AT T E M P T S TO A D D R E S S
T R A D E M A R K B U L LY I N G
There have been several attempts to address
trademark bullying. For example, shaming is a way to
reduce overreaching trademark enforcement,20 legislation has been proposed to address the problem, and
commentators have suggested a number of reforms.
Notably, a major change in trademark law to address
the issue is unlikely because trademark bullying is
intimately tied to enforcement practices that are
part and parcel of trademark law and theory itself. A
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wholesale change to the way we use and understand
trademark law is unlikely. For example, it is doubtful
that the government will become responsible for all
trademark enforcement. That likely would result in
a cost-prohibitive system. A more tailored response
to bullying itself is a more probable solution, such as
making it easier to obtain attorney fees.
First, shaming is essentially the practice of
publicizing—made easier because of social media—
the “bad behavior” of the trademark bully. Because
trademark owners are concerned about their reputation, a trademark owner may consider the costs of
bullying before issuing a cease-and-desist letter if they
do not want to be labeled a “bully.” A Web site such
as Chilling Effects Clearinghouse attempts to shame
bullies by publishing cease-and-desist letters.21
The famous Jack Daniels cease-and-desist letter is
an example of a thoughtful response to the possibility
of shaming.22 In that case, Jack Daniels sent a carefully worded cease-and-desist letter to an author of
an expressive work who used some parts of the Jack
Daniels label and design as the cover of his book.
Jack Daniels’ counsel carefully made the point that
Jack Daniels enforces its mark and why it enforces its
mark. Jack Daniels’ counsel also provided a “reasonable” exit strategy for the author. One excellent result
of the letter from Jack Daniels perspective—even if the
author may have a good claim it can use the label and
design—is that another person and in this case lots
of people were educated that Jack Daniels protects its
marks. Indeed, the letter provided an excellent education about trademark law and the Jack Daniels mark
without appearing to be “oppressive.” This was a brilliant way to shape consumer understanding.
There is, at least, one problem with reliance on
shaming to address the bullying problem. Sometimes
shaming may operate in a way that may not be helpful.23 For example, the nonprofit sector reportedly
has problems with outright fraud.24 However, many
nonprofits are very wary of enforcing their trademarks
for fear of being labeled a “bully” or unfairly stifling
a competitor attempting to “do good.” Nonprofits
are very concerned about their reputations and may
not enforce their mark against arguably deceptive
conduct because of that fear even in the face of real
consumer confusion. Some industries actually may
need more trademark enforcement.25
Second, legislation has been proposed to specifically address the trademark bullying problem. For
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example, the State of Minnesota considered passing legislation designed to curb trademark bullies.26
However, to date, the legislation has not passed.
The Ninth Circuit has applied the California AntiSlapp statute to conduct related to the ownership
and infringement of a trademark.27 A plaintiff in that
case brought a trademark infringement claim, among
other claims, against a defendant that filed a trademark application. The Ninth Circuit determined that
filing a trademark application was protected conduct
under the California Anti-Slapp law. However, the
Ninth Circuit ultimately decided that the plaintiff’s
causes of action for attorney malpractice, conversion,
breach of fiduciary duty, and fraudulent concealment
could continue because there was a “reasonable probability of success.”28 Under California law, a reasonable probability is a “minimal level of legal sufficiency
and triability.”29 State Anti-Slapp laws could be used
to stop or discourage some types of trademark bullying, specifically directed at conduct that implicates
First Amendment values. However, the claim must
truly be overreaching. Notably, Congress currently
is considering a federal Anti-Slapp law that may be
applied to address some types of trademark bullying.30
Finally, some attempts by courts to directly or
indirectly address patent trolling also may apply to
trademark bullying. For example, the US Supreme
Court’s 2006 eBay v. MercExchange decision specifically rejected the Federal Circuit’s presumption
in favor of issuance of an injunction when a patent
is found valid and infringed.31 At least two Circuits
have extended eBay to trademark cases, thus rejecting
the presumption of irreparable harm when a trademark has been infringed.32 Arguably, eBay may reduce
the amount of trademark enforcement by making it
more difficult to obtain an injunction. Moreover, the
Supreme Court’s 2014 Octane Fitness v. Icon Health
and Fitness decision makes it easier to obtain attorney
fees in patent cases.33 The Third Circuit already has
extended Octane Fitness to trademark infringement
cases by rejecting its prior more restrictive test for
awarding attorney fees.34 The easier availability of
attorney fees may deter some trademark bullying
behavior. Indeed, in Renna v. County of Union, the
magistrate judge recommended an award of $39,535
in attorney fees following the Third Circuit’s Fair
Wind decision against an apparent “trademark bully:”
the County of Union in New Jersey claiming trademark rights in its seal.35 The defendant wrongfully
29
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asserted in cease and desist letters, and in litigation,
that it had registered trademark rights in a seal.36
Notably, all of the circuits have not followed eBay
and Octane Fitness, but some circuits may continue
to extend those decisions to trademark cases. This
may deter some bullies from bringing suit—at least in
those circuits.
In another case, a Massachusetts court applying
the Lanham Act, awarded over $500,000 in attorney
fees against a supposed “trademark bully” plaintiff
who brought an action for the purpose of protecting
its reputation instead of a concern about the likelihood of confusion as to sponsorship or source.37 The
court noted that: “[plaintiff] subjected Long Bow to
protracted and costly litigation not to protect the
good will of its trademark from misappropriation, but
to suppress criticism of Jenzabar’s principals and its corporate practices.”38 The court further explained that:
Jenzabar’s multiple and shifting legal and factual theories, asserted at the various stages of
the case, support the same conclusion, as does
its objection to pro hac vice admission of the
lawyer who assumed Long Bow’s defense after
it had exhausted its resources. In this regard,
the differences in economic power between
the parties is one of many circumstances that
tends to confirm the conclusion that Jenzabar
engaged in extortionate conduct, making this
case exceptional.39
This case is particularly troublesome because
it involved arguably protected speech concerning
someone involved in a politically sensitive matter.40
An Anti-Slapp statute may have been helpful for
the defendant. The attorney fees award in this case,
of course, is a great victory for the alleged infringer,
but it only happens after almost total financial ruin
of the defendant and a long period of time expended
in litigation.41
The answer to the trademark bullying problem
or some of its costs—at least from a practical perspective in some cases—may be early enforcement
of trademarks. Trademark law is, again, unlikely to
substantially change, so enforcement is here to stay.
However, from a practical perspective, a trademark
owner concerned about the protection its mark
receives may help smaller businesses by letting them
know as soon as possible that they may have a
30
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trademark problem. If a smaller business is notified
early, the business may not have incurred substantial
costs in advertising and may not have a very large
following. There certainly is an access to justice issue
with respect to trademark selection and defense in the
face of accusations of infringement.42

TRADEMARK TROLLS
The best known intellectual property enforcement problems involve so-called patent trolls, also
sometimes known as non-practicing entities or patent
assertion entities. Patent trolls are entities that do not
invent, commercialize, or practice patented technologies. Patents trolls merely exist to extract licensing fees
from entities that actually invent, commercialize, or
practice patented technology. Patent trolls arguably
provide little benefit to society and just impose additional costs that often are passed on to consumers.
Some do argue that patent trolls, for example, help
inventors monetize their inventions. While there is
considerable press concerning patent trolls, there is
much less discussion concerning so-called trademark
trolls in the United States—persons enforcing trademarks who do not actually use the trademark. There
are at least eight reasons why this is true.

1. USE REQUIREMENT
The requirement of use in US trademark law
makes it highly unlikely a non-practicing entity will
be able to enforce a trademark. Use is a prerequisite for
obtaining trademark rights in the United States.43 Even
an intent-to use application filed at the USPTO must
be perfected by actual use of the mark in connection
with the goods or services in commerce. Abandonment
is the flip-side of the use requirement. If a mark is
not used in commerce, there is a possibility that the
mark will lose trademark protection.44 Moreover, the
prohibitions against naked licensing and assignments
in gross also recognize the importance of the use
requirement.45 For example, marks must be licensed
with their goodwill. The continuation and extension
of goodwill require use of the mark itself. Marks also
must not be assigned in gross. This prohibition recognizes that a mark must be connected to the goodwill
which also requires continued use of the mark. Thus,
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because of the use requirement, it is highly unlikely a
non-practicing entity can bring a suit against another
entity to essentially “hold-up” that entity.46 However,
the continued erosion of the use requirement as well as
prohibitions against naked licensing and assignments
in gross may make it more likely a trademark troll issue
could emerge. Indeed, some experts have cautioned
that Canada’s move away from requiring use could lead
to trademark trolls.47

2. THE ANTI-CYBERSQUATING ACT,
UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE
RESOLUTION POLICY, AND
TOP-LEVEL DOMAINS
An area that supposed “trademark trolling” could
occur involves domain names.48 Many domain name
squatters did not have “legal” trademark rights to
a particular domain name, but were warehousing
domain names that were well-known trademarks to
“hold-up” trademark owners. Essentially, a domain
name squatter would purchase a well-known trademark as a domain name and offer to sell it to the
trademark owner for a price. While there have been
problems with domain name squatting, policy makers
have addressed these problems to squelch potential
“trademark trolling.”
Congress reacted to the specific problem of domain
name squatting by passing the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act (ACPA).49 The ACPA
created a federal cause of action for the bad faith registration, trafficking and usage of another’s trademark
or a confusingly similar version of the trademark. The
statute does not require an analysis of the similarity of
the goods and services and also applies to dilutive use of
famous marks. The ACPA’s remedies include cancellation and forfeiture of the domain name. Some commentators have noted that the ACPA has been relatively
successful in stopping domain name squatting—or at
least providing an effective way to address it.
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (ICANN) also provides the Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP).50
The UDRP provides an arbitration system to resolve
domain name disputes that may be faster than proceeding in court. The UDRP provides standards
that attempt to discern whether the domain name
owner has registered or used the mark in bad faith
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and without a legitimate reason to use the mark.
Specific facts are analyzed to determine if a party
has a legitimate right to use the mark and there is an
understanding that multiple parties may have legitimate reasons to use the mark. The UDRP’s remedy is
cancellation and transfer of the domain name. The
UDRP generally is considered a success in curbing
domain name squatting. The federal Lanham Act also
specifically protects trademark owners from abusive
use of the dispute resolution policy under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(2)(D)(iv). This section allows for a trademark
owner to receive damages, costs and attorney fees for
“abuse of process” or “malicious prosecution” under
the domain name dispute resolution system.
Based on its experiences with domain name squatting, ICANN provided a thoughtful roll-out of the new
top level domain names which considered trademark
issues relatively carefully. To prevent the abusive registration of top level domain names, ICANN instituted
several policies including Legal Rights Objections, the
Uniform Rapid Suspension System, Trademark PostDelegation Dispute Resolution Procedures, and the
Trademark Clearinghouse.51 Legal Rights Objections
allowed trademark owners to file objections to applications for new top-level domain names. Legal Rights
Objections fees were set at a relatively low level to
allow for greater use. ICANN also created the Uniform
Rapid Suspension System (URSS) which complements the UDRP. The URSS was designed to resolve
disputes involving trademark infringement quickly
and efficiently. ICANN developed the Trademark
Post-Delegation Dispute Resolution Procedures. This
system addresses the Registry Operator’s conduct in
trademark infringement of a domain name. ICANN
created a Trademark Clearinghouse which is a list
of owned trademarks. If a mark similar to one registered on the Trademark Clearinghouse is applied for,
then the trademark owner receives notice and can
determine whether there is infringement. ICANN’s
foresight—based on experience—has arguably led to
a relatively smooth transition to the offering of new
top-level domains.

3. OPPOSITION AND CANCELLATION
PRACTICE
One proposal to address patent trolls has been
the creation of meaningful third party opposition
31
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proceedings at the USPTO to challenge pending and
granted patents.52 Notably, trademark law already
provides for meaningful and frequently used opposition and cancellation proceedings to challenge marks.
Opposition proceedings are brought against a pending
trademark. The standing requirements for bringing an opposition proceeding are very broad, which
enables anyone who believes they would be damaged
by a filed mark to bring the opposition. One of the
grounds for challenging a mark by opposition is based
on a likelihood of confusion. This allows a trademark
owner to ensure that a potential troll does not obtain
trademark rights in a confusingly similar mark to the
first user. This lowers the chance that a troll can holdup a first user, perhaps in a market in which the first
user may later expand.
Importantly, the trademark system publishes
marks in the Official Gazette before the mark is
registered. This allows trademark owners the opportunity to determine whether a mark is confusingly
similar or dilutive and an opposition is warranted.
Trademark owners also can bring cancellation proceedings against registered marks. Notably, there is a
possibility of abuse of the cancellation and opposition
proceedings system. Indeed, the trademark Web site
Trademarkia has labeled some trademark owners who
bring many cancellation and opposition proceedings
against companies that file for marks as “trolls.”53
However, this may be misleading. As a commentator
noted, many of those labeled trolls brought legitimate
claims against potential infringers.54 Moreover, a
defendant in an opposition or cancellation proceeding can bring a counterclaim against the first user’s
mark. This puts the first user’s mark at issue and
could result in the first user losing its trademark protection. This arguably creates an incentive to bring
claims that have merit and are not merely frivolous.
However, the cost of litigation always is a concern.

4. DECISIONS DIRECTED TO PATENT
TROLLS
As addressed in the prior section on trademark
bullies, the US Supreme Court has issued decisions
directed to patent trolls that are now applied in the
trademark context. The eBay v. MercExchange55 decision concerning injunctions and the Octane Fitness v.
Icon Health and Fitness case about attorney fees both
32
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may deter the development of a trademark troll problem. For example, eBay v. MercExchange has been
applied in the trademark context and makes it more
difficult to prove irreparable harm. This reduces the
bargaining power of any potential trademark troll.
Also, Octane Fitness v. Icon Health and Fitness56 has
been applied in the trademark context and makes it
easier to obtain attorney fees in some jurisdictions.
This may deter some trademark trolls from bringing
an overreaching claim for fear of having to pay the
trademark owner’s attorney fees.

5. STRATEGIC LITIGATION ADVANTAGES
AVAILABLE TO PATENT TROLLS
The strategic advantages that make patent trolling a relatively successful enterprise may not exist
in trademark practice. Some strategic advantages
include unavailability of infringement counterclaims,
asymmetrical discovery, availability of forum shopping, and the opportunity to engage in holdups.57
For example, the use requirement may open up a
supposed trademark troll to a counterclaim based on
infringement because of a dispute as to who was the
actual first user. The use requirement also may mean
that there will be some discovery not only on the
defendant’s side, but also on the plaintiff’s side. There
also is a lesser likelihood of forum shopping because it
does not appear there are specific forums that would
be favorable to trademark owners. Finally, there is less
of an opportunity for hold-up because trademark law
actually considers the intent of the alleged infringer
or diluter, which the patent law does not do.

6. CONSUMER PROTECTION STATUTES
The use of consumer protection statutes against
patent trolls may deter a trademark troll problem
from developing.58 For example, some state attorney
generals have brought actions against patent trolls
for sending abusive cease and desist letters.59 The
FTC has settled one case concerning abusive cease
and desist letters in the patent context. State attorneys general and the FTC may act similarly against
trademark trolls and, indeed, the possible threat of
suit may deter the problem from developing in the
first instance.
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7. US COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT

6. William T. Gallagher, “Trademark and Copyright Enforcement
in the Shadow of IP Law,” 28 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech.
L. J. 453, 496 (2012).
7. Id.

One commentator has argued that a reason for
the development of a patent troll problem is the US
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal
Circuit).60 His argument is that the Federal Circuit
is captured by the patent bar and issues pro-patent
decisions that have led to the patent troll problem.
Unlike patent law, trademark law federal appellate
jurisdiction is based on where the suit is filed not
based on subject matter. Thus, it is more difficult for
the trademark bar to capture each of the courts of
appeal throughout the United States making it less
likely a pro-trademark law will develop.

8. SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISION
A Seventh Circuit case dealt relatively harshly
with a trademark troll by canceling the troll’s mark,
and awarding attorney fees and costs against it.61 This
case may have provided a disincentive for entities to
engage in trademark trolling behavior.

CONCLUSION
Trademark law and theory are unlikely to change
and thus, vigorous enforcement of marks also is likely
to continue. While trademark bullying does appear
to be a problem, methods such as shaming and the
availability of attorney fees may deter some bullying
practice. Trademark trolling has not yet emerged in
the United States as a significant problem. However,
changes to the law concerning the use requirement
and other areas of trademark law may lead to the
development of an issue in the future.
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